Ontology
The study of what exists
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| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Ontology | The study of what exists |
| Inverted spectrum problem | Another person could be experiencing colors in a systematically inverted way (e.g., seeing red as green) while still behaving and using color words exactly the same as you. We can’t get into each others’ heads so we rely on people’s reports of what they’re experiencing. Without objective measurements, we rely on those reports to coordinate our language. |
| Philosophy of perception: Sensation | High sensory content, low conceptual content — the experience as it’s experienced. Just the sensory input. |
| Philosophy of perception: Conception | Low sensory content, high conceptual content — an act of the mind to form a general idea, or a complex product of abstract or reflective thinking about a subject. |
| Philosophy of perception: Perception | Both sensory and conceptual content in varying amounts. Transforming raw sensory data into meaningful, interpreted experiences that form our understanding of the world. |
| Direct realism | The idea that we get direct experience of a mind-independent reality. Just because you look at a table straight down instead of sideways, doesn't make the table change shape. |
| Indirect realism | The view that while an external world exists independently of the mind, we do not perceive it directly. Instead, we perceive the world indirectly through an intermediary called sense data (perceptions). |
| Idealism | The idea that there is no mind-independent reality. Reality is fundamentally mental, spiritual, or consciousness-based rather than material. All we perceive are thoughts, ideas, or concepts, because that’s all there is. If there were no more minds, everything would cease to exist. |
| Argument from illusion | We sometimes experience things that aren’t there, like phantom limbs. How can we be experiencing reality directly if we have experiences that are literally false? |
| Brain-in-vat (BIV) | Imagine somebody took out your brain and put it in a vat and hooked you up to a computer where they can program any kind of experience. This implies all of your experiences are false, but you can never tell the difference. This means some form of idealism must be true. |
| Simulation argument | It’s possible to build a computer with enough power to simulate all of what we call reality. If it’s possible, then either (1) we never do it, (2) we do it, and we’re the non-simulated people, or (3) we do it and we are the sim people. Bostrom says (1) and (2) can’t work so (3) is true. |