Benetti v. Duffy (1930)
Implications: Negligence is failing to act with ordinary prudence, causing harm; can be action or inaction when duty exists. | Page 1, top
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
Benetti v. Duffy (1930) | Implications: Negligence is failing to act with ordinary prudence, causing harm; can be action or inaction when duty exists. | Page 1, top |
Lynch v. Miller (1955) | Implications: Elements of negligence are 1) legal duty, 2) breach, 3) harm, and 4) direct/proximate cause of harm. | Page 1, second from top |
Savage v. Jones (1980) | Implications: Duty of care arises when defendant creates risk, volunteers protection, knows of potential harm, or shares a business/voluntary relationship. | Page 1, third from top |
Silberman v. Satterfield (1983) | Utilities must provide reasonable care under reliability code, but plaintiffs must prove breach and causation. | Page 1, third from bottom |
Terry v. Ko (1985) | Proving a duty exists is not enough; plaintiff must also prove the defendant failed to act reasonably in fulfilling the duty. | Page 1, second from bottom |
Leander v. Minzer (1990) | Reasonableness is an objective test based on a reasonably prudent person acting under similar circumstances, ignoring personal traits or low intelligence. | Page 1, bottom |
Faris v. Steinhauer (1991) | A certain precaution is required if burden of taking it on (B) is less than probability of harm without the precaution (P) times the loss if the harm occurs (L); B < P x L. | Page 2, top |
Kim v. French (1993) | Industry standards and community customs are relevant but dispositive. | Page 2, second from top |
Iacomini v. Chapman (1999) | A defendant's compliance with industry standards is relevant to assess whether they acted reasonably, but it is not dispositive | Page 2, third from top |
Pandya v. Schumock (2003) | A defendant following or violating internal policies is relevant evidence of reasonableness, but not dispositive. | Page 2, third from bottom |
Adediji v. Adeite (2010) | In a sudden emergency, juries should evaluate whether the defendant should have addressed a predictable risk with prior training or procedures. | Page 2, second from bottom |
Hopson v. Dawson (2012) | High-risk actions can be reasonable in rare emergencies. But if the actor's own harmful conduct caused the emergency, they may still be liable. | Page 2, bottom |
Bomberger v. Kelly (2012) | Those with superior skill or knowledge must act accordingly; professionals are judged by the standards of their trade. | Page 3, top |
Allen v. Neptune Underwater Expedition (2013) | Follows up on Bomberger v. Kelly. The standard of care is higher for practitioners, but professionals are held to a higher standard than amateurs in the same profession. | Page: 3, second from top |
Yanka v. Edwards Industries (1961) | Causation requires 1) direct cause - the plaintiff wouldn't have been harmed "but-for" the defendant's actions and 2) proximate cause - the harm was the forseeable result of the defendant's conduct, and could have been anticipated. Page 3, third from top |
Haug v. Kolb (1975) | Foreseeable risk requires anticipating the general type of risk, not the exact target or precise way harm occurs. | Page 3, third from bottom |
Jeff v. Wario's Toolkit (1974) | In a civil case, elements must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. | Page 3, second from bottom |
Guerra v. Guerrini-Maraldi (2002) | Fact finders can rely on direct (what someone saw, heard) and circumstantial evidence (evidence requiring inference) equally. | Page 3, bottom |
Clement v. Mason (2015) | The prosecution questioning a defense's alternate theory does not shift the burden of proof. | Page 4, top |
Estate of Rory Behm v. Zamborini, Inc. (2017) | A traffic citation may be relevant to establishing negligence, but does not automatically equate to negligence | Page 4, second from top |
Bennett v. O'Herin (2020) | Affirmative defenses must be established by a preponderance of the evidence. | Page 4, middle |
Purdue v. Waldie (1969) | The :intervening and superseding cause" affirmative defense requires an act that: 1) could have produced harm 2) not forseeable to defendant 3) not a result of the defendant's harmful conduct | Page 4, second from bottom |
Carter v. Meyer (2017) | The "Unavoidable accident" affirmative defense proves that the harm would have occurred despite zero negligence. | Page 4, bottom |
Zomerfeld v. Noto (2012) | Trial courts may rely on inadmissible evidence to determine the admissibility of other evidence | Page 5, top |
Jung v. Lopez (2015) | Courts may consider custodial documents to determine admissibility without regard to the document's own admissibility. | Page 5, second from top |
Thomas v. Davis (2001) | Parties cannot say that evidence is no longer admissible because they change something they contest in a pleading. The pleadings are set. | Page 5, middle |
Karan v. Baboons, Inc. (2004) | Plaintiffs must prove harm in bifurcated trials, but judges should limit evidence related to the extent of the harm/damages | Page 5, second from bottom |
Herrera v. Olmsted (2005) | Admitted allegations in a complaint should not be excluded if they're useful for evaluating other disputed aspects. | Page 5, bottom |
Kissner v. Polk Hospital (2005) | Stipulations only apply to the text of the rule. If parties have stipulated that an exhibit is pre-admitted but not that it's true/accurate, they have not stipulated that the content of the exhibit is correct. | Page 6, top |
Greller v. Harish (2019) | The Midlands Rules of Evidence govern over federal rules where differences exist. | Page 6, second from top |
Shakur v. Wallace (1994) | Fact finders determine witness credibility, but testifying witnesses cannot opine on the truthfulness of other witnesses. | Page 6, middle |
Graham v. Duckworth (2024) | Shakur v. Wallance only bans asking witnesses if another is lying. However, witnesses can be asked about things like inconsistent testimony or aware of why a witness woud lie. | Page 6, second from bottom |
Filteau v. Wanek (1992) | Courts assume a statement was made by a given person if a jury could find by preponderance that they made it. | Page 6, bottom |
Ginger v. Heisman (2015) | An electronic communication listed as coming from someone is sufficient foundation the communication was sent by that person. | Page 7, top |
Simpson v. Rose (1992) | Statements imposing legal responsibilities establish legal significance, so the statements are admissible non-hearsay. | Page 7, second from top |
Farrant v. Westaway (1994) | Using a statement to identify a particular object is a permissible non-hearsay purpose. | Page 7, middle |
McDonald v. Parks (1995) | Opposing party statements under MRE 801(d)(2) do not require the statement to be against the party's interest. | Page 7, middle |
Dolly v. Ringo (2010) | MRE 801(d)(2) can only be invoked in one direction (plaintiff offers defendant statements, and vice versa). | Page 7, second from bottom |
America's Best Cookie v. International House of Waffles (2011) | Hearsay includes out-of-court statements by witnesses testifying at trial. | Page 7, bottom |
Kaplan v. Sikora (2013) | Under 801(d)(2)(D), a statement is admissible if 1) declarant is party's agent or employee 2) statement content relates to employment relationship 3) statement was made while the relationship existed | Page: 8, top |
Chambers v. By the Book Publishing, Ltd. (2015) | Hearsay only applies if an out-of-court statement is used for the truth of the matter, not for whether a statement was made. | Page 8, second from top |
State v. B.F. De la Porta (2024) | Hearsay only applies to truth value asserted in the statement, not any "implied" truth value | Page 8, second from bottom |
Coburn Camera Crew v. Ellicott City (1989) | Character evidence rules apply to corporations; businesses cannot use safe acts elsewhere to defend against negligence. | Page 8, bottom |
Krent v. Lions, Inc. (2009) | Character evidence of an alt suspect is admissible if its relevance outweighs its prejudicial effect | Page 9, top |
Donnelly v. Caulder (2011) | MRE 609 does not categorically exclude prior criminal convictions under one year, especially crimes of dishonesty. | Page 9, second from top |
Vir v. Londo Manufacturing Co. (2011) | Corporations are charged with knowledge of facts learned by agents within their scope of employment. Particularly where the agent would have reasonably be expected to act on or communicate the facts | Page 9, middle |
McMahon v. Mohan (2019) | Corporations are liable for all employee/agent acts within the scope of employment. | Page 9, middle |
Davis v. Adams (1993) | Judges ensure that scientific testimony is relevant and reliable. Judges must consider the methods and data. | Page 9, second from bottom |
Tarot Readers Association of Midlands v. Merrell Dow (1994) | To assess 702(c) for an expert, judges should consider a number of relevant factors, though not a dispositive list | Page 9, bottom |
Richards v. Mississippi BBQ (1997) | Under Rule 703, experts cannot merely summarize inadmissible hearsay without relating it to specialized knowledge/conclusion. | Page 10, top |
Kane Software Co. v. Mars Investigations (1998) | Expert reports must contain all opinions testified to on direct and redirect. | Page 10, second from top |
Yu-Oh Industries v. Beckstein Alekri, Inc. (2000) | Experts don't have to list every basic scientific fact or background document. | Page 10, bottom |
Diamond Design Productions v. Fountain (2001) | Witnesses and experts may not offer legal conclusions or interpret the law under Rule 704. | Page 11, top |
Winn v. Wu (2001) | Affidavits can substitute for expert reports if judges decide before trial that they contain complete opinions, bases, and qualifications. | Page 11, middle |
Jeffries v. Polk County Police Department (2007) | Law enforcement officers are generally not experts under MRE 702, but can give non-expert opinions under MRE 701 based on their specialized training. | Page 11, second from bottom |
Windbigler v. Vithala (2017) | Midlands does not require tendering an expert before eliciting expert testimony. | Page 11, bottom |
Sheth v. Dean (2018) | An expert's opinion can be reliable even if they have never testified in court before. Conversely, an expert testifying before does not make an unreliable opinion admisible | Page 12, top |
Omnidirectional Solutions v. Little Bird Word LLC (2023) | Tarot Readers reliability standards are not rigid; judges should not use the specific examples listed in the case to bar otherwise credible testimony | Page 12, second from top |
Moore v. Campbell (2014) | Witnesses must be able to respond to cross examination. | Page 12, middle |
Nichols v. Varma (2015) | In a civil case, the fact finder & parties can comment on a person's decision not to testify | Page 12, second from bottom |
Davis v. HappyLand Toy Co. (2011) | In a wrongful death action, deceased and surviving spouse are both 'parties.' However, in a wrongful death action, the surviving spouse's distress is not relevant and may be overly prejudicial if it does not have other evidentiary value. | Page 12, bottom |